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A striking relationship between visual spatial perspective taking (VSPT) and social skills
has been demonstrated for perspective-taking tasks in which the target of the imagined
or inferred perspective is a potential agent, suggesting that the presence of a potential
agent may create a social context for the seemingly spatial task of imagining a novel
visual perspective. In a series of studies, we set out to investigate how and when a
target might be viewed as sufficiently agent-like to incur a social influence on VSPT
performance. By varying the perceptual and conceptual features that defined the targets
as potential agents, we find that even something as simple as suggesting animacy for a
simple wooden block may be sufficient. More critically, we found that experience with one
potential agent influenced the performance with subsequent targets, either by inducing
or eliminating the influence of social skills on VSPT performance. These carryover effects
suggest that the relationship between social skills and VSPT performance is mediated
by a complex relationship that includes the task, the target, and the context in which that
target is perceived. These findings highlight potential problems that arise when identifying
a task as belonging exclusively to a single cognitive domain and stress instead the highly
interactive nature of cognitive domains and their susceptibility to cross-domain individual
differences.
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The ability to imagine the world from the point of view of another
person comes in a variety of forms, from understanding another
person’s opinion on a discussion topic to literally imagining what
the visual world would look like from their perspective. The latter,
termed visual-spatial perspective taking (VSPT), has tradition-
ally been considered a form of spatial problem solving. However,
over the course of the last decade, there has been a growing body
of research supporting a relationship between one’s social abili-
ties and the ease with which they are able to engage in this more
visually driven form of perspective taking (Brunyé et al., 2012;
Kessler andWang, 2012; Shelton et al., 2012), highlighting the role
of VSPT for everyday social interactions. Impairment on tasks
that require adopting another’s perspective—be it to judge if an
object is visible from another viewpoint (Level 1 VSPT) or to
represent what a spatial layoutmight look like from another view-
point (Level 2 VSPT)—is a hallmark feature of Autism Spectrum
Disorders (ASD; Baron-Cohen, 1992; Best et al., 2008). A vast
majority of the research examining this relationship between
social and VSPT abilities tends to come in two forms: either inves-
tigation of how/when VSPT abilities are impaired or preserved
in individuals with ASD due to their known deficits in social
skills (Hobson, 1984; David et al., 2006; Hamilton et al., 2009;
Gould et al., 2011; Zwickel et al., 2011; Schilbach et al., 2012) or
investigations of the natural variability that is observed in more
typically-developing populations (Brunyé et al., 2012; Shelton
et al., 2012).
One approach to understanding how social abilities might
influence VSPT is through the investigation of the role that agents
play in cognitive tasks. A wide range of literature on embodied
cognition has investigated the conditions and tasks that appear to
be sensitive to the presence of a human agent (Eppel et al., 1983;
Schober, 1998; Ruby and Decety, 2001; Ames et al., 2008; David
et al., 2008; Tversky and Hard, 2009; Kessler and Rutherford,
2010; Kessler and Thomson, 2010; Schilbach et al., 2012). For
example, Schober (1998) has demonstrated that people will make
an effort to adopt a listener’s perspective when describing a spa-
tial display, whereas they use their own perspective or neutral
statements such as cardinal directions when asked to simply
describe the display (no human listener). Similarly, Tversky and
Hard (2009) asked individuals to describe spatial events depicted
in scenes with or without the presence of another person in
the scene. They found that the scene descriptions differed such
that the participants spontaneously adopted the perspective of
a person in a scene, even when such perspective taking was not
relevant to the task. Moreover, they had no direct contact with
the agent, suggesting that it was the mere presence and not any
interactive requirement that motivated spontaneous perspective
taking. Additionally, Schilbach et al. (2012) showed a sensitivity
toward face-like stimuli that had a modulatory effect on per-
formance when completing a gaze-mediated stimulus-response
compatibility paradigm. When the social context of the stimuli
was manipulated (face, face-like, or object stimulus), there was a
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reduction in the observed congruency effects for faces as com-
pared to objects, suggesting that there was an effect of social
context on action control. Based on these results, it is clear that
human participants are sensitive to the presence of other human
agents in ways that affect performance.
An alternative line of work has explored how agency might
be attributed to objects (Zwickel, 2009; Zwickel et al., 2011;
Zwickel and Müller, 2013). In a series of studies, Zwickel and
colleagues set out to better understand VSPT when non-human
entities were used as the target of perspective taking, both
in typically-developing individuals (Zwickel, 2009; Zwickel and
Müller, 2013) and those with ASD (Zwickel et al., 2011). This
was first accomplished by examining whether individuals would
adopt the perspective of geometrical shapes if the movement
of the shapes appeared intentional. Intentionality was manipu-
lated by using movements that implied interactions between the
shapes. For example, when two triangles were moving about each
other, they might evoke descriptions that reflect theory of mind
(ToM) such as, “The small triangle surprised the large triangle.”
Zwickel (2009) presented individuals with either the systematic
ToM movement or random movement and found that individu-
als spontaneously adopted the perspective of the probed triangle
when the movement implied agency but not when the movement
was random. Follow-up work on individuals with ASD showed
that although they were able to understand that the triangles were
interacting in one case (ToM condition) and not in the other
(random condition), the additional attribution of agency did not
occur as evidenced by less appropriate descriptions of the anima-
tions (Zwickel et al., 2011). Therefore, it was concluded that in
the case of individuals with ASD, although the perceptual cues
(type of movement) were sufficient to invoke intentionality, they
did not imbue the triangles with agency. These studies highlight
one possible feature, intentional movement, which may be nec-
essary for non-human targets to be perceived as potential agents.
However, it is unknown what the potential boundary conditions
are associated with perceived agency and the minimal require-
ments needed for stimuli to evoke VSPT when the stimuli are
static.
In addition to understanding how agency attribution impacts
VSPT, an additional line of research has been focused more on
investigating the direct relationship between social abilities and
VSPT. In particular, Brunyé et al. (2012) assessed whether gender
and sub-clinical autistic traits were not only predictive of VSPT,
but could differentiate between the levels of VSPT. The VSPT
tasks used in this study required participants to either determine
whether a light was visible from the perspective of an avatar (Level
1) or whether the light was to the left/right of the avatar (Level
2) and participants completed the autism quotient (AQ; Baron-
Cohen et al., 2001). The overall score on the AQ was used with
higher scores being indicative of greater autistic-like traits. Results
from this study found slowed reaction times for the Level 2 VSPT
task in males and females with relatively high AQ scores, sug-
gesting that individuals with more autistic-like traits had greater
difficulty taking the perspective of the avatar. This relationship
was not seen for the Level 1 VSPT task. Taken together, these
findings suggest that even in sub-clinical healthy populations,
having more autistic-like traits influences one’s ability to engage
in perspective taking when the judgment to be made goes beyond
asking whether something might be visible in the alternative per-
spective and requires amore complex set of judgments to bemade
about the spatial properties of the visual scene from an alternative
perspective.
In a similar manner, Shelton et al. (2012) focused more specif-
ically on social skills by using a combined score derived from
the AQ social and communication subscales. As such, a lower
score on this combined AQ score would be associated with indi-
viduals who have strong social skills whereas a higher score
would be more associated with individuals who are less socially
savvy 1. In this experiment, participants were seated in front of
a display of three buildings with seven different colored poten-
tial targets of perspective taking oriented around the display at
45◦ intervals. Participants were presented with an image and were
asked to identify which viewpoint was being displayed, whether
it be their own or one of the potential targets. Agency was
manipulated by having each participant complete three different
conditions: artist figures, triangles, and cameras. It was hypothe-
sized that artist figures would be more human-like than either the
triangles or cameras, with triangles as clear inanimate objects and
cameras as potential intermediaries of perspective (people look
through them). A striking relationship was found. Participants
with lower AQ combo scores (more social) were more accurate
at taking the perspective of the artist figures (r = −0.584) than
those with higher AQ combo scores (less social), whereas no such
relationship was found for either the triangles (r = −0.084) or
the cameras (r = −0.053) conditions. It should be acknowledged
that all of the conditions used objects, but the relative amount of
potential agency conveyed varied across the different conditions.
As such, these findings point to another potential requirement
for perceived agency, especially with respect to static images; that
is, it may be necessary for the potential “agents” to possess some
human-like qualities.
Not only do these studies provide indications as to what it
means for an object to be perceived as a potential agent, they also
introduce a framework for distinguishing when VSPT includes a
social component or not. That is, VSPT may be primarily spa-
tial and remain so when targets do not evoke the suggestion of
social engagement, but VSPT may become more dependent on
interactions with social skills when targets are more agent-like,
allowing one’s social skills to influence behavior for better or for
worse. This offers a method for assessing what kinds of targets
might make VSPT more or less social. In particular, we can use
the correlation between VSPT performance and social skills as a
measure of when VSPT is or is not incurring social skill influ-
ence. If a target is motivating the task to be a “socially relevant”
form of VSPT, we expect a relationship between measures of social
skill and VSPT performance. However, if a target is not incurring
the agency necessary to motivate social relevance, we expect to
1One important note on social skills in this context is that the relevant
dimension is likely to be one’s understanding and appreciation of social
attributes and situations rather than social-seeking behavior or extroversion.
Throughout, we use this broader definition, suggesting a form of social intel-
ligence or savvy rather than more strictly whether someone engages in more
or less social activity .
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see a “non-social” form of VSPT such that social skills are not
correlated with VSPT performance. Critically, we do not predict
opposite relationships for socially relevant and non-social VSPT,
but rather suggest that the task can either be sensitive to social
influence or not (see Figure 1).
Using this approach to assess social influence, we can begin
to ask deeper questions about what targets, target features, and
conditions change the way an individual approaches the VSPT
task. First, we can test how changing basic features might influ-
ence the degree to which a target seems to acquire agency that
brings social skills to bear. In the previous study (Shelton et al.,
2012), we used brute force differences (human form vs. inanimate
objects), but more subtle information can also be manipulated.
For example, we can manipulate the presence or absence of very
basic facial features. Second, we can ask whether and how experi-
ence with one type of target might modulate the perceived agency
of another target, which we refer to as experiential context. In the
previous study (Shelton et al., 2012), there was no effect of order,
suggesting that having seen the artist figures first did not make
the triangles more or less sensitive to the influence of social skills.
Moreover, seeing the triangles followed by artist figures did not
make the artist figures more or less sensitive. However, as noted
above, these were already different classes of objects. Here we con-
sider what happens to perceived agency when targets share certain
features but not others.
To address these issues, we ran a series of experiments that
compare the original targets from the previous study, plain tri-
angles and artist figures, to other variations that might convey
more or less agency as evidenced by an influence of social skills
on VSPT performance. First, we set out to establish whether
adding human-like features to an object would increase the sen-
sitivity to social skill influence. In Experiment 1, we compared
plain triangles to triangles with eyes affixed to them, making
them appear more human-like (or at least Muppet-like) via
visual features. In Experiment 2, we compared the artist figures
FIGURE 1 | Potential framework depicting the relationship between
social skills and VSPT performance for proposed socially-relevant and
non-social VSPT. The distinction between these two types of tasks is
captured by the degree to which VSPT is incurring a social skill influence
indexed by the magnitude of the correlation.
condition from our previous study, which showed the relation-
ship between social skills and VSPT, to agents with even more
human-like qualities, fashion dolls. In both Experiments 1 and
2, we contrasted conditions that vary on known visual features
and counterbalanced order to allow us to explore any modula-
tion of the social skill relationships due to experiential context.
Lastly, we wanted to ask whether we could increase sensitivity
to social skill influence by conceptually manipulating the mean-
ing of a target of perspective taking. In Experiment 3, we return
to the plain triangles, but now refer to them as “Aliens” in an
effort to convey that these could be creatures with agent-like
qualities. This manipulation allowed us to ask whether a con-
ceptual cue to agency can be robust enough to bring about
the influence of social skills on VSPT performance. Overall,
results from these studies reveal the complexity of the relation-
ship between social skills and VSPT, highlighting the suscepti-
bility of individual differences to contextual and cross-domain
influences.
GENERAL MATERIALS AND METHODS
All three of the correlational experiments used the same basic
paradigm, varying only the target of the VSPT task.
PARTICIPANTS
All participants were Johns Hopkins University undergraduate
students between the ages of 18–22 who participated in return for
extra credit in psychology courses. All procedures were approved
and conducted in accordance with the Johns HopkinsHomewood
Institutional Review Board. For all studies, inclusion in the study
was based on the 0◦ orientation trials (described in more detail in
the subsequent section). Because this type of VSPT task is dif-
ficult and a wide range of scores is typically observed, we did
not want to exclude individuals merely because they fell along
the lower end of the distribution. Therefore, we reasoned that
if participants could correctly identify their own view, then we
could assume that they understood and were engaged in the
task. As such, we excluded individuals who made more than
one error on these trials. Across all of the experiments, this cri-
terion seemed to successfully separate those who were on task
from those who were not. Moreover, for each experiment, an
effort was made to obtain approximately equal numbers of males
and females. The analyses for each experiment included exam-
ining potential differences in performance between the genders.
Consistent with previous findings obtained by Shelton et al.
(2012), the differences between males and females on all mea-
sures and correlations were negligible and will not be discussed
further.
MATERIALS, DESIGN, AND PROCEDURES
For each experiment, participants completed a set of measures
that included the three buildings task, paper-and-pencil spa-
tial skill tests, and a self-report questionnaire (the AQ described
below) in a pseudorandom order. The spatial skill tests adminis-
tered are part of a standard battery of measures typically included
across all experiments in the lab; they were not pertinent to the
hypothesis-driven questions being addressed and had little or no
relationship to the outcomes presented below.
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Three buildings (3Bldgs) task
Participants completed the 3Bldgs task, which is an adaptation
of Piaget’s three mountains perspective-taking test (Piaget and
Inhelder, 1967). For this task, participants viewed two different
displays. Each display consisted of three unique buildings (6 dif-
ferent buildings total) with each building constructed out of
LEGO® building blocks (Lego Group, Billund, Denmark) and
placed on 24′′ diameter plastic disks that were covered in faux
grass mats. Each display disk was centered on a 36′′ diame-
ter wood table and photographed from 8 different orientations
separated by 45◦ increments. Around the building display were
seven uniquely colored targets for perspective taking (red, blue,
white, black, purple, yellow, and orange). Targets were placed at
45◦ intervals and corresponded to headings of 45◦, 90◦, 135◦,
180◦, 225◦, 270◦, and 315◦ with respect to the participants’ des-
ignated view of 0◦. The targets were manipulated across the set
of experiments to assess the potential impact on the perceived
agency (see Figure 2) and are described in greater detail with the
corresponding experimental manipulation.
Participants were seated in front of the physical display and
viewed images on a laptop computer. Each presented image
corresponded to the would-be visual perspective of one of the
targets or to the participant’s own perspective (0◦). Participants
were asked to identify the perspective of the image. For each
image, irrespective of the task version, the participant was asked,
“Which<TARGET> is at this view?2” Participants indicated their
response by pressing a key corresponding to the color of the
target or the spacebar to indicate that it was his/her own view.
Each task version consisted of 40 self-paced trials (5 trials at each
FIGURE 2 | Example of one of the three buildings displays showing the
different target conditions used in the Experiments: upper left
(Experiments 1 and 3), upper right (Experiment 1), lower left and right
(Experiment 2).
2This question was intentionally vague to limit potential bias in the language
that might influence how the participant should interpret the task and the tar-
get. Using language such as “Who sees this. . . ?” might affect interpretation of
agency (i.e., “who” denotes a being; “seeing” is a property of an agent).We also
acknowledge that this wording does not explicitly tell the participant to men-
tally visualize the space. As such, it is possible that some participants engaged
more or less visual imagery as opposed to other forms of spatial reasoning.
However, we have no reason to suspect that this same variability in strategy
does not hold for all VSPT tasks.
orientation) with a 5-s response deadline. Response latency and
accuracy were measured.
The 0◦ orientation (where the participant was seated) was
selected randomly for each participant from one of 4 possible ori-
entations. For each display, the four candidate orientations were
selected by randomly choosing one orientation and using the
3 additional orientations that were opposite and orthogonal to
that initial orientation. For a given start orientation, targets were
placed at the remaining seven orientations. When appropriate,
display-condition assignment and order of conditions were coun-
terbalanced, and the order of the target colors around the display
was selected randomly for each participant and kept constant for
both conditions (when applicable).
Autism quotient (AQ; Baron-Cohen et al., 2001)
The AQ is a self-report questionnaire designed to assess the degree
to which individuals vary on five traits typically associated with
ASD—social skills, perseveration, attention to detail, communi-
cation, and imagination—with higher scores (overall and each
subscale separately) reflecting stronger ASD-like traits. For the set
of experiments presented here, the critical scales of interest are the
social and communication impairment scales, which are designed
to capture behaviors on a continuum from socially appropriate
to socially inappropriate behaviors. Due to the strong correlation
observed in Shelton et al. (2012) between the social and com-
munication impairment subscales, we used the same combined
social/communication score as the previous study. For clarity, we
term this the social ineptitude score, reflecting the fact that higher
scores mean less social. This social ineptitude score is used in all
analyses for each experiment.
EXPERIMENT 1: TRIANGLESWITH ANDWITHOUT EYES
In this experiment, we set out to assess whether objects could be
made sensitive to the influence of social skills by adding features
suggestive of agency. Specifically, participants were asked to com-
plete two conditions in which they either took the perspective of a
triangle (plain triangles condition) or took the perspective of a tri-
angle that had eyeballs affixed to the top of it (triangles-with-eyes
condition). First, we expected no relationship between social skills
and performance with plain triangles, replicating our previous
work. For the triangles-with-eyes condition, we used the magni-
tude of the correlation between social skills and performance as
an index to determine whether eyeballs were sufficient for induc-
ing potential agency in an object. If any sign of agency “socializes”
the task, then we might expect a correlation comparable to that
observed for the artist figures in Shelton et al. (2012). However,
we may also see a gradation of social skill influence dependent
upon the degree of potential agency induced, in which case the
triangles-with-eyes would show a weaker correlation than other
more agent-like targets. Such a result would necessitate additional
comparisons. Finally, we might see that static triangles are objects
regardless of whether they have eyes or not, with no correlation
observed in either condition.
In addition to the basic comparison of triangles with and with-
out eyes, we also entertained the possibility that the order of the
conditions could affect observed correlations. Given that these
two conditions use the same basic object, they may provide a
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more direct contrast of their potential agency than the triangles,
cameras, and artist figures used in our previous research study
(Shelton et al., 2012). As such, we considered whether seeing the
plain triangles first might imbue the subsequent triangles with
eyes with more agency than they might convey on their own
(when experienced first). This might result in the correlation for
triangles-with-eyes being weaker when performed first than when
performed after plain triangles. Plain triangles provide an even
more interesting case in that they are expected to show no corre-
lation, especially if experienced first. However, it is possible that
seeing triangles-with-eyes as potential agents could carryover to
subsequent performance with plain triangles, making them more
sensitive to the social skill influence.
MATERIALS AND METHODS
Participants
For this experiment, 78 naïve participants were enrolled. Six par-
ticipants (2 males) failed to meet criterion, leaving 72 participants
(34 males) included in all subsequent analyses.
Materials, design, and procedures
Participants completed two versions of the 3Bldgs task using
plain triangles and triangles with eyes as targets. Using a set of
14 identical wooden triangular blocks, we created two sets of
seven different colored triangles (see above) placed on plain wood
pedestals (13′′ total height). One set served as the plain triangles
condition. For the second set, 1′′ round wooden eyeballs painted
white with black circles were affixed to the top of each triangle to
create the triangles-with-eyes condition (see Figure 2). For each
image, irrespective of the task version (plain triangles/triangles-
with-eyes), the participant was asked, “Which Triangle is at this
view?” Each participant completed both versions of the task using
two different displays. Display-condition assignment and order
of conditions were counterbalanced. After applying the exclu-
sion criterion, we had approximately equal numbers in each
order (plain triangles first n = 34). The order of the target col-
ors around the display was selected randomly for each participant
and kept constant for both conditions.
RESULTS
Mean response latency (overall and for correct trials only)
and overall accuracy were calculated for both versions of
the 3Bldgs task and were separately subjected to a mixed
ANOVA with order as a between-subjects variable and target
(plain triangles/triangles-with-eyes) as a within-subjects variable
(Figure 3). For response latency, there were no significant effects
or interactions (all ps > 0.11). For accuracy, we found that
the group that performed the plain triangles first were signifi-
cantly less accurate than the group that performed the triangles-
with-eyes condition first, F(1, 70) = 5.75, p = 0.019, η2G = 0.05.
Although this effect was significant, it was a small effect, account-
ing for only about 5% of the measured variance. Moreover, we
also observed that participants were significantly more accurate
on the triangles-with-eyes condition than the plain triangles con-
dition, F(1, 70) = 5.98, p = 0.017, η2G = 0.02. Again, this was a
small effect (2% of the measured variance). There was no sig-
nificant order × target interaction, F(1, 70) = 1.97, p = 0.165.
FIGURE 3 | VSPT performance (mean accuracy and response latency)
as a function of the target conditions for Experiment 1. Error bars
reflect ±1 standard error of the mean.
Although these effects are fairly small, it suggests that it may
be important to consider whether some targets’ perspectives are
more readily adopted overall, and, more critically, the role order
may play when investigating the relationship between social skills
and performance on our VSPT conditions.
In addition to assessing conditional differences, we also corre-
lated the performance on the plain triangles and triangles-with-
eyes conditions. Accuracy was positively correlated, r = +0.44,
p < 0.001. This relationship is consistent with our previous study
(Shelton et al., 2012) and suggests that there is a common spatial
component to the VSPT task, irrespective of target condition.
To answer the critical question of social skill influence on
VSPT performance we explored the correlations between social
skills and accuracy3 on the VSPT task for the two target condi-
tions overall and then for each order separately. All correlations
are significant at α = 0.05, corrected for the size of the rele-
vant subset of correlations investigated unless otherwise specified.
Consistent with Shelton et al. (2012), we observed a significant
correlation between the social and communication impairment
subscales from the AQ (r = 0.42); therefore, due to this observed
relationship and to be consistent with previous literature we used
a combined scored (social ineptitude score) in all analyses (see
Table 1 for separate correlations with subscales). Lower values on
the social ineptitude score would be associated with better social
skills, whereas higher values on the social ineptitude score would
be associated with poorer social skills. Overall, we observed no
correlation for the plain triangles condition, r = −0.18, p = 0.12
and a negative correlation for the triangles-with-eyes condition,
r = −0.46, indicating that more social individuals had better
performance than less social individuals for the triangles-with-
eyes condition. A t-test for non-independent r’s was conducted
and revealed that these correlations were significantly different,
t(69) = 2.45, p = 0.02, suggesting that adding eyes to the plain tri-
angles allowed objects to become sensitive to social skill influences
in VSPT.
An examination of the effect of order on these correlations
paint a more complex picture, as can be observed in Figure 4,
which shows the correlations for both conditions separately for
each order. For the triangles-with-eyes condition, the correlation
3Consistent with previous data, response latency had no significant correla-
tions (strongest was r = +0.1).
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Table 1 | Summary of correlations (and p-values) between the
relevant social skill scores and each condition, overall and by order of
conditions where relevant.
Social subscale Communication Social ineptitude
subscale score
EXPERIMENT 1
Plain triangles
Overall +0.01 (0.939) −0.33 (0.005)* −0.18 (0.123)
1st +0.23 (0.202) −0.04 (0.805) +0.13 (0.479)
2nd −0.20 (0.232) −0.50 (0.001)* −0.43 (0.008)*
Triangles-with-eyes
Overall −0.26 (0.031) −0.54 (<0.001)* −0.46 (<0.001)*
1st −0.29 (0.077) −0.46 (0.003)* −0.46 (0.004)*
2nd −0.22 (0.219) −0.60 (<0.001)* −0.45 (0.008)*
EXPERIMENT 2
Artist figures
Overall +0.01 (0.920) −0.15 (0.195) −0.08 (0.521)
1st −0.25 (0.160) −0.45 (0.007)* −0.39 (0.022)
2nd +0.20 (0.235) +0.07 (0.678) +0.14 (0.391)
Fashion dolls
Overall −0.25 (0.032) −0.48 (<0.001)* −0.40 (0.001)*
1st −0.21 (0.209) −0.41 (0.011) −0.33 (0.045)
2nd −0.32 (0.067) −0.61 (<0.001)* −0.52 (0.002)*
EXPERIMENT 3
Triangle aliens −0.27 (0.066) −0.34 (0.017)* −0.36 (0.013)*
All p-values presented are uncorrected for multiple comparisons; *indicates the
correlations that survive the correction for multiple comparisons within related
subsets.
FIGURE 4 | VSPT performance as a function of social ineptitude score
separately for the plain triangles (left) and triangles-with-eyes (right)
conditions broken out by order for Experiment 1.
was significant regardless of the order in which the conditions
were completed, r = −0.46 and−0.45, supporting the claim that
placing eyes on the simple triangles was sufficient to bring about
the social skill influence. Performance on perspective taking with
plain triangles had previously not shown a significant correla-
tion with social skills (Shelton et al., 2012), and that was again
the case when this condition was performed as the first con-
dition, r = +0.13, p = 0.48. However, when the plain triangles
followed the triangles-with-eyes, there was a significant nega-
tive correlation, r = −0.43, that was not significantly different
from those observed for the triangles-with-eyes in either order,
ps > 0.45. Additionally, this correlation was significantly differ-
ent from the correlation when the plain triangles were viewed
first as evidenced by a z-transform for independent correla-
tions, z = −2.35, p = 0.009. As such, plain triangles incurred
as much influence from social skills as triangles-with-eyes when
participants had experienced the triangles-with-eyes first.
In cases where we observed a correlation with the social inep-
titude score, we also compared their magnitude to the correlation
observed for artist figures in the previous study (r = −0.58;
Shelton et al., 2012) using a z-transform for independent corre-
lations. None of the comparisons were significant, all ps > 0.16,
suggesting that the triangles-with-eyes and the plain triangles
(when presented after the triangles-with-eyes condition) were
showing correlations in the same range as previously observed for
artist figures.
DISCUSSION
The goal of Experiment 1 was to determine whether an object
previously shown to be insensitive to social skill influence could
be made sensitive by adding an agent-like feature. Adding eyes
to triangles had two important impacts on performance. First,
we did observe the significant correlation between performance
on the triangles-with-eyes condition and social skills, suggesting
that features such as eyes can create targets of perspective tak-
ing that are sensitive to the influence of social skills. In essence, it
appears placing static features on an object may convey a sense of
agency similar to what was observed for animating shapes (e.g.,
Zwickel, 2009). In addition, we observed that our plain trian-
gles could also be imbued with some agent-like attributions by
simply following the experience of the task with the triangles-
with-eyes.
It is tempting to argue that the act of performing the task
with an implied social context might keep participants in a
state of “social-ness” rather than actually imparting the agency
or sociality on the plain triangles. This seems unlikely given
that we failed to find any order effects (or even trends that
would suggest order effects) in the previous study (Shelton et al.,
2012) and pilot work when the targets were different kinds of
objects. Instead, it seems that the shared properties of the tri-
angles with and without eyes may have allowed the agency (or
sensitivity to social influence) induced by the eyes to carry over.
In Experiment 2, we examine a variation on this carry over
effect by contrasting two different representations of human
form.
EXPERIMENT 2: ARTIST FIGURES AND FASHION DOLLS
Experiment 1 started with an object and examined whether we
could induce sensitivity to social skill influence. In Experiment 2,
we started with the artist figures that were first used to demon-
strate the correlation between social skills and VSPT in this
paradigm and compared them to a target with more human-
like features to assess whether the correlation might be sensi-
tive to the degree or extent of implied agency. In addition, we
again varied the order of the conditions to examine whether
experience with the putatively stronger potential agent might
strengthen or weaken the sensitivity of the putatively weaker
potential agent.
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MATERIALS AND METHODS
Participants
For this experiment, 82 naïve participants were enrolled. Ten
participants (5 males) were excluded due to failure to reach
criterion, leaving 72 participants (30 males) eligible for all sub-
sequent analyses.
Materials, design, and procedures
Participants completed two versions of the 3Bldgs task. In the
artist figures condition, each target was a 13′′ tall wooden artist
figure with its head painted one of seven unique colors. In the
fashion dolls condition, we used a set of 7 distinct Barbie™ dolls
(Mattel, Inc., El Segundo, CA), with each fashion doll wearing
a colored dress corresponding to the colors used in the artist
figures condition (see Figure 2). For each image, irrespective
of the task version (artist figures/fashion dolls), the partici-
pant was asked, “Which Doll is at this view?” Each participant
completed both versions of the task using two different dis-
plays. Display-condition assignment and order of conditions were
counterbalanced. After applying the exclusion criterion, we had
approximately equal numbers in each order (artist figures first
n = 38). The order of the target colors around the display was
selected randomly for each participant and kept constant for both
conditions.
RESULTS
Mean response latency (overall and for correct trials only) and
overall accuracy were calculated for both versions of the 3Bldgs
task and were separately subjected to a mixed ANOVA with order
as a between-subjects variable and target (artist figures/fashion
dolls) as a within-subjects variable (see Figure 5). For both
response latency and accuracy, there were no significant effects or
interactions (all ps > 0.23 for response latency and all ps > 0.07
for accuracy). Again, we observed a significant positive correla-
tion between accuracy with fashion dolls and accuracy with artist
figures, r = +0.46, p < 0.001.
Given the observed correlation between the social and com-
munication impairment subscales from the AQ (r = 0.69), all
subsequent correlations were run between the social ineptitude
score and the accuracy on the two agency conditions overall and
then for each order separately (see Table 1 for separate correla-
tions with subscales). All correlations are significant at α = 0.05,
FIGURE 5 | VSPT performance (mean accuracy and response latency)
as a function of the target conditions for Experiment 2. Error bars
reflect ±1 standard error of the mean.
corrected for the size of the relevant subset of correlations investi-
gated unless otherwise specified. Overall, we observed a negative
correlation for the fashion dolls, r = −0.40, indicating better
accuracy with better social skills. Surprisingly, no such corre-
lation was observed for the artist figures, r = −0.08, p = 0.52.
This is contrary to our previous studies where we have consis-
tently observed this correlation (Shelton et al., 2012). A t-test for
non-independent r’s confirmed that these two correlations were
significantly different from each other, t(69) = 2.82, p = 0.006.
The unexpected result in the artist figures overall made the
motivation for examining order effects even stronger. Figure 6
shows the correlations broken down by order. For the fashion
dolls, the correlation between social ineptitude score and per-
formance was weaker when fashion dolls were presented first,
r = −0.33, p = 0.04 uncorrected, but met the criterion for mul-
tiple comparisons when fashion dolls were presented second,
r = −0.52. Although the correlation numerically increased when
fashion dolls were presented second, the difference between the
two correlations was not significant, z = 0.97, p = 0.17, sug-
gesting that the correlation was similar irrespective of order.
An examination of the artist figures condition revealed a more
complicated picture. That is, when artist figures came first,
performance showed a correlation with the social ineptitude
score similar to what was observed previously (Shelton et al.,
2012), r = −0.39, p = 0.02 uncorrected (comparison to r =
−0.58, z = 1.33, p = 0.09), but when these same artist figures
followed the experience with fashion dolls, the correlation with
the social ineptitude score was weak and in the opposite direction,
r = +0.14, p = 0.39. The correlations for the artist figures in the
two different orders were significantly different, z = 2.26, p =
0.001, suggesting that the social skill sensitivity was modulated
by the context in which the particular targets were experienced.
DISCUSSION
Experiment 2 provides a second example of how the degree to
which a target of perspective taking appears to be socially relevant
can be influenced by the experience of other targets. Artist figures,
which were used to establish the initial correlation between social
skills and VSPT in this paradigm, were essentially stripped of their
sensitivity to social skill influence when they were experienced
after performing the task with fashion dolls.
FIGURE 6 | VSPT performance as a function of social ineptitude score
separately for the artist figures (left) and fashion dolls (right)
conditions broken out by order for Experiment 2.
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Although both Experiments 1 and 2 demonstrate how context
can affect the sensitivity to social skill influences, the results may
seem contradictory. In Experiment 1, having the putatively more
agent-like target first increased the sensitivity for the subsequent
less agent-like target, whereas Experiment 2 showed the opposite
effect. However, the figures used in Experiment 2 were not the
same object varying in a feature or two; they were two different
representations of human form that varied on a variety of visual
features (continuity of form, faces, hair, clothing, etc.). Although
the artist figures can clearly convey agency in a way that allows a
social skill influence, they are also affected by the context in which
they are experienced.
The broader issue of context effects and target influences will
be addressed inmore detail in the General Discussion, but first we
turn our attention to another form of context. All of our manip-
ulations of potential agent-like features so far have been visual
features. It is also possible to create conditions in which objects
might be viewed as agents via conceptual context. Whether we
can induce sensitivity to social skill influence using a conceptual
context is the question for Experiment 3.
EXPERIMENT 3: TRIANGLE “ALIENS”
One of the clear conclusions of Experiments 1 and 2 is that
objects can be sensitive to social skill influences as a function
of having features that suggest potential agency. Whether affix-
ing eyes to simple shapes or using representations of the human
form, these features appear to affect how individuals approach the
perspective-taking task. We also observed a form of conceptual
carryover from the triangles-with-eyes to the plain triangles. As
a final test, we asked whether a purely conceptual manipulation
could also make an object sensitive to social skill influence. Using
the plain triangles again, we offered an alternative interpretation
of the triangles as potential agents by calling them “aliens” dur-
ing the perspective-taking trials. If triangles with eyeballs on top
motivate the task to become more social in nature, then perhaps
simply suggesting a type of being, be it alien or otherwise, might
operate in a similar manner.
MATERIALS AND METHODS
Participants
For this experiment, 53 naïve participants were enrolled. Five par-
ticipants (3 males) failed to meet criterion, leaving 48 participants
(24 males) included in all analyses.
Materials, design, and procedures
Participants completed the 3Bldgs task using the same 7 triangu-
lar blocks on pedestals described in Experiment 1. For each image
the participant was asked, “Which Alien is at this view?” Across
participants, the display type was counterbalanced and the order
of the target colors around the display was selected randomly for
each participant.
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
Mean response latency was 3018 and 3054ms overall and for
correct trials only, respectively, and overall accuracy was 72.9%.
Again, we observed a significant correlation between the AQ
social and communication impairment subscales, r = +0.46,
so we again used the social ineptitude score (see Table 1
for separate correlations with subscales). The critical correla-
tion between the social ineptitude score and performance on
the VSPT task with triangle aliens was significant, r = −0.36
(see Figure 7). Moreover, this correlation was not signifi-
cantly different from the correlation obtained for the triangles-
with-eyes condition either overall or separated by order in
Experiment 1, ps > 0.65. These results suggest that even in
the absence of a visual feature, an object can become sen-
sitive to social skill influence on VSPT through conceptual
suggestion.
GENERAL DISCUSSION
One of the key motivations for this special issue on develop-
ing a framework for integrating the “social” and the “spatial”
is the recent acknowledgment of a clear relationship between
VSPT and aspects of ones savvy in social situations (Hamilton
et al., 2009; Zwickel et al., 2011; Brunyé et al., 2012; Shelton
et al., 2012). By definition, VSPT tasks involve the need to
consider/imagine/reason about a target perspective that is dif-
ferent from one’s own. As such, it is tempting to conclude that
VSPT is both a spatial and social task. However, these tasks
can vary dramatically with respect to who or what is the place-
holder for the target perspective. Our previous work has shown
that the relationship between VSPT performance and social
skills depends on the nature of the target; targets that could be
seen as potential agents were sensitive to social skill influence,
whereas targets that did not have agent-like features were insen-
sitive (Shelton et al., 2012). These and similar results (Zwickel,
2009; Zwickel et al., 2011; Schilbach et al., 2012; Zwickel and
Müller, 2013) suggest that VSPT tasks acquire some social rel-
evance when the target has potential agency. Using correlations
between measures of social skills and performance on VSPT,
the present study offers a more detailed account of what fea-
tures and conditions can affect the degree to which any given
target might convey agency and become sensitive to social skill
influence.
One of the first implications of the present work is that simple
physical features can induce an object to be sensitive to social skill
influence. In the previous study, the physical form of a wooden
artist figure appeared to motivate participants to engage the VSPT
FIGURE 7 | VSPT performance as a function of social ineptitude score
for the triangle aliens condition.
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task in a more social manner than either plain triangles or cam-
eras (Shelton et al., 2012). Although triangles do not resemble
human forms, in the present study, we were able to observe the
same social skill influence on VSPT by simply adding eyeballs
to the triangles. This small featural change seemed to push par-
ticipants to engage the triangles as if they were potential agents,
like the artist figures. Taken together, this body of work suggests
that there are different visual features that can motivate one to
perceive an object as a potential agent. The global shape of the
artist figures likely conveyed the sense that this could be a per-
son form, whereas the presence of eyes (which the artists figure
did not actually have) likely conveyed a similar sense for triangles.
These differences raise important questions about what other fea-
tures or combinations might be more or less effective in engaging
the social mechanisms that appear to be brought to bear, but they
establish the very basic notion that minimal change can assert a
strong influence.
In addition to the observation that physical features can induce
agency, we also observed that the context defined by experiences
surrounding the introduction of particular targets in perspec-
tive taking can also play a role in the perceived potential agency.
First, we found that when a target closely resembles another
object that has recently been attributed with agency, the sim-
ilarity of object features may be sufficient to convey carryover
agency. Performing VSPT with plain triangles as targets is gen-
erally insensitive to social skill influence when performed prior
to other conditions or in the context of artist figures or cam-
eras. That is, on their own, they are not potential agents. Despite
their fundamental characterization as inanimate objects, these
same plain triangles can be engaged as if they were potential
agents when they immediately follow experience with identical
triangles with eyes affixed to them. In other words, experiencing
triangles-with-eyes as agents allowed plain triangles to be viewed
as agents.
The artist figures provide a second case of experiential con-
text. When performing the task with artist figures in the context
of plain triangles or cameras, the artist figures represent the con-
dition that shows the strongest numerical relationship between
social skills and performance (Shelton et al., 2012). Similarly,
when participants experienced the task with the artist figures first
in Experiment 2, we saw a similar performance-social skill cor-
relation to other “agent” conditions. However, when participants
experienced the artist figures after exposure to the fashion dolls,
this correlation was diminished completely for the artist figures
condition, such that it had the same magnitude correlation as
plain triangles alone. In this case, it was as if experiencing the
fashion dolls as agents made the artist figures seem not only less
agent-like but not at all agent-like, akin to a purely inanimate
object.
As noted previously, the two types of triangles and two types
of dolls represent opposing effects of experiential context (for a
more in-depth discussion of experiential social context or his-
toricity, see Schilbach et al., 2013). For the triangles, we had
identical objects that differed only in the presence or absence of
a single agent-like feature (eyes). Whatever attributes the eyes
appeared to bring to the triangles on which they were affixed
(triangles-with-eyes condition) lingered when the triangles were
presented again without eyes (plain triangles). One argument
might be that the triangles were viewed as the same triangles with
and without eyes. That is, once the triangles had been imbued
with potential agency, having them “return” without eyes did
not immediately strip them of the attributes that were motivat-
ing the task to take on social relevance. By contrast, the fashion
dolls and artists figures are clearly not the same object but are
different representations of human form. Although artist fig-
ures alone may be sufficient to engage the social mechanisms
that affect performance with agent-like targets, they appear to
lose any attributes that convey a sense of agency when one has
had experience with the more representative form of the fash-
ion doll. Anecdotally, some participants even remarked that the
artist figures seemed “creepy” after seeing the fashion dolls. This
type of comment has never been noted before in our previ-
ous studies nor in the condition when the artist figures came
first, suggesting that the experiential context was asserting a
strong influence over the perception of the objects at a very
basic level.
Although not significantly different from the cases presented
here, it is notable that the artist figures in Shelton et al. (2012)
had a numerically larger correlation than any of the conditions in
the present study. This may be due to the fact that the artist figures
were experienced in the context of two other objects that did not
possess agent-like qualities (plain triangles and cameras). In 2/3 of
the orders used for the study, the artist figures would have come
after one or both of the object conditions, which may havemagni-
fied the correlation relative to the conditions used in the present
study. The lack of order effects on the correlations in the origi-
nal study is potentially problematic for this argument. However,
given that the artist figures when presented first had a correlation
of −0.39 in the present study it is possible that the original study
was insufficiently powered to detect changes from such a high
baseline correlation. Again, this suggests that the role of experien-
tial context may be a critical factor in the way individuals engage
a VSPT task with different targets.
Both the induction of agency and contextual effects noted
above are driven by physical features. For example, the carry-
over of agency from triangles-with-eyes to plain triangles likely
depended on the agency evoked by the physical features of the
eyes carrying over to the highly similar plain triangles. Likewise,
the many agent-like features of the fashion dolls appeared to con-
vey agency, and the diminished agency for artist figures following
experience with fashion dolls likely depended on the contrast of
these “rich” agents to the highly dissimilar artist figures. However,
the conveyance of agency is not limited to physical features. In
Experiment 3, the performance on the VSPT task with plain
triangles was again correlated with social skills when the trian-
gles were referred to as aliens rather than triangles. Implying a
being, albeit an alien being, appears to be similar to adding phys-
ical features such as eyeballs, motivating participants to engage
in the task in a way that allows social skills to assert influence.
This suggests that when interpreting the targets of a VSPT task,
people may have a very low threshold for allowing a target to
be “social.”
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A running theme through this work is the introductory frame-
work in which the target and possibly other features of a VSPT
task can affect whether the task itself is socially relevant or not.
Using this framework, we have demonstrated that the degree
to which a task appears to be social or not involves the com-
plex interaction of target features and experiential context, which
includes the presence of other targets and the language used
to identify the targets. One might be tempted to conclude that
this work is largely about methodology, and in some sense,
this is the case. Although we have not exhaustively tested all
types of targets or target combinations, our findings clearly offer
some suggestions for how to craft a VSPT task that is or is not
sensitive to social skill influence. For example, if one’s goal is
to understand VSPT in isolation, what we have termed non-
social VSPT, then one can design a task that limits the potential
agency as much as possible. However, this work also speaks to
and raises many deeper theoretical issues about how the human
brain processes spatial information in order to reason about the
world.
A first critical point is that the sensitivity of VSPT performance
to targets and experiential context is consistent with the notion
that VSPT in real-world settings is not a task that happens in iso-
lation. For example, imagine sitting in the stands at a ball game
waiting for a friend. Your friend is lost, but you can see him under
the scoreboard. By phone, you might give him directions based
on what you know he can currently see. The particular directions
you give might be influenced by a wide variety of concerns—your
friends known ability to mix up left and right, the urgency with
which you want to get him to the seat before first pitch, whether
you want him to pass the concession stand to grab refreshments,
etc. In this example, the ability to relate to the friend’s situa-
tion involves both the understanding of visual-spatial perspective
(what the friend can see) but also the socially relevant situational
factors (the friend’s state, abilities, goals). Therefore, one’s per-
formance should be dependent on the interaction of spatial and
social skills such that this socially relevant VSPT situation will
benefit if social skills are strong but might be hindered if they are
weaker.
This still leaves the broader question of why the specific judg-
ments participants were asked to do in our VSPT task should
be influenced by social skills when targets appear to convey
agency. That is, one could imagine that the ballgame example
could be accomplished by having the spatial reasoning done by
a “purely” spatial computational process with social skills only
entering at the point of deciding how to communicate that infor-
mation to an agent. Our task only requires the judgment and
not a tailored communication of the outcome, suggesting that
the social influence may be operating throughout the process
of perspective taking. Although our results are ambivalent with
respect to how the presence of an agent-like target might be
altering the underlying computations, we offer some speculation
about how this interaction might come about. One possibility
is that VSPT involves first essentially embodying the target of
the potential perspective one is attempting to assess (i.e., one is
attempting to assume the target’s position in order to see its view-
point). As may be the case with spontaneous perspective taking
(Tversky and Hard, 2009), a potential agent as a target may auto-
matically induce one to consider the target’s social/personality
attributes. One’s comfort level in understanding or appreciating
these attributes may then serve to gate how readily the perspec-
tive can be assumed. For example, an individual who is more
socially savvy might be able to more readily recognize the util-
ity of a potential agent through efficient assessment of relevant
attributes (e.g., the eyes on the fashion doll means she might
have the ability to see) and dismissal of irrelevant and unknown
attributes (e.g., she is happy and has good fashion sense), whereas
an individual with less social savvy might experience inhibition in
trying to take the perspective of a potential agent because he/she
cannot apprehend the attributes as readily and choose those that
would facilitate embodiment. By contrast, when the perspective
taking involves an object as the target, there are no obvious social
attributes, so one’s social savvy will neither hurt nor help, as it is
irrelevant.
In this working model, we do not propose different mecha-
nisms or processes for VSPT with agents vs. objects. Instead, we
are suggesting that there is a common spatial component irrespec-
tive of the target, which is consistent with the observed correla-
tions between the different versions of the VSPT task (targets with
and without agency). However, when there is an agent, social skills
may act as a gateway for the initial step of embodying the target.
This proposed role suggests that we will still see individual differ-
ences in the spatial aspects of the tasks, regardless of target type,
but we will have additional variability due to social skills when the
target is a potential agent. Whether the proposed model above or
an alternative framework ultimately captures the interaction of
social and spatial skills, this work motivates a deeper question:
what are the advantages of having a system that is generally sensi-
tive to the presence of agents for a seemingly spatial task given that
this sensitivity can benefit some individuals and hinder others rel-
ative to non-social conditions? Is this driven by the folk wisdom
that humans are simply social beings? These are open questions
and ones not readily addressed empirically, but they provide fod-
der for thinking critically about the interactive nature of human
cognition.
The overarching goal of this project was to deepen the explo-
ration of factors that determine whether and when VSPT might
be sensitive to the influence of social skills. Taken together, the
results suggest that the social influence on VSPT is mediated by
a complex relationship that includes the task, the target, and the
context in which the target is perceived. Future studies may con-
tinue to elaborate on the various boundary conditions that evoke
agency or take it away, but the broader message from our work
and similar studies is the importance of thinking beyond the
bounds of a single domain to explain the complexity of human
behavior.
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